UAE Mercenaries Hunted as Sudan Bombs RSF Convoy Deep Within Chad

A serious cross-border incident has escalated tensions in eastern Chad. Sudanese Armed Forces aircraft and drones pursued and bombed a large vehicle convoy belonging to the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces more than 100 kilometers inside Chadian territory, according to confirmation from Chad’s military.

Chadian authorities described the Thursday strike (around 20:00 local time) in the Mourdi department near the Sudan border as a violation of sovereignty. The Chadian Army stated that the aircraft and drones—attributed to the SAF and/or its allies—followed and attacked the convoy deep into its territory. Satellite imagery showed dozens of burn scars and vehicle fires roughly 78 km from the border. No Chadian casualties were reported. Chad’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs is preparing a protest note, while its forces have been placed on high alert.

Officials in Khartoum have framed the action as targeting RSF logistics. Sudan’s military has long accused neighboring states of enabling rebel supply lines. The RSF, led by Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (Hemedti), has been fighting the SAF since April 2023 in a conflict that has produced one of the world’s worst humanitarian crises, with accusations of genocide and mass atrocities—particularly in Darfur, including the fall of El Fasher.

Chad as a Logistics Hub of UAE Support

Since the war began, multiple investigations have documented extensive use of Chadian territory—especially the Amdjarass airstrip in the east and facilities around N’Djamena—as a transit point for supplies reaching RSF-controlled areas in Darfur. Cargo flights originating in or linked to the United Arab Emirates have repeatedly landed at these sites under the stated purpose of humanitarian aid, including support for field hospitals. UN experts and analysts have described “credible” evidence that some of these flights carried weapons, ammunition, drones, and other military equipment diverted to the RSF, often then moved overland.

Investigations in 2026 traced Boeing aircraft linked to companies associated with a former U.S. military contractor operating from Chad’s military airport section to RSF hubs such as Nyala in Sudan and Kufrah in Libya. A subsequent draft UN report indicated these planes transported RSF fighters, foreign mercenaries, drones, and weapons. The UAE has consistently and strongly denied providing any military support to the RSF, insisting its activities are purely humanitarian and that claims of arms transfers lack substantiation.

Sudanese authorities have repeatedly warned neighbors against facilitating such logistics. The latest airstrike appears intended to disrupt these supply chains beyond Sudan’s borders.

Broader Pattern of UAE Engagement in Regional Conflicts

The allegations surrounding Sudan fit a wider pattern of UAE involvement in multiple conflicts across the Middle East and Africa over the past decade, often through a mix of direct military participation, arms transfers, financial support, training, and proxy forces. Abu Dhabi has sought to counter political Islam (particularly Muslim Brotherhood-linked groups), secure maritime and commercial interests (including Red Sea and Horn of Africa routes), and expand influence via ports, bases, and resource access.

• In Yemen, the UAE payed mercenaries to fight the Houthis in 2015, contributing significant ground and air forces. It later shifted emphasis to supporting southern separatist groups such as the Southern Transitional Council while maintaining counter-terrorism operations.
• In Libya, the UAE provided substantial backing—including air support and equipment—to eastern commander Khalifa Haftar’s Libyan National Army during its 2019–2020 offensive against the UN-recognized government in Tripoli.
• In Ethiopia, Emirati drones and training support aided the federal government against Tigrayan forces during the 2020–2022 conflict.
• In Somalia and its autonomous regions, the UAE has developed security partnerships, funded training (including the Puntland Maritime Police Force), and invested heavily in ports such as Berbera in Somaliland.

These interventions have frequently involved private military contractors and foreign fighters. Historical patterns include Sudanese fighters deployed to Yemen on the UAE’s behalf and earlier use of South African private military companies.

Colombian Mercenaries Tracked, Paid, and Now Hunted

A particularly documented element in the Sudan conflict involves the recruitment, payment, training, and deployment of Colombian private military contractors to support the RSF. Human Rights Watch’s May 2026 report detailed how an Abu Dhabi-based company, Global Security Services Group (GSSG)—with reported links to senior Emirati officials and the ruling family—hired hundreds of Colombian contractors. These individuals transited through UAE military facilities (including sites in Ghiyathi and Al Wathba), received training from Emirati personnel in some cases, and were deployed via hubs in Chad, Libya, and Somalia to fight alongside or train RSF forces.

Roles included infantry, artillery, drone operations, vehicle crews, and instruction—sometimes of young recruits. Phone-tracking investigations placed devices associated with these mercenaries at key locations before and during major RSF operations, including the capture of El Fasher, where mass atrocities occurred. U.S. sanctions have targeted elements of the recruitment network. The UAE has denied permitting its territory for recruitment, training, financing, or transit of foreign fighters for any conflict, including Sudan, and stated it investigates related allegations.

Reports indicate these contractors were paid by the UAE-linked companies. Investigators have followed their phones, flights, and training sites across borders. The Chad strike now shows those same supply lines being hunted in the open—convoys run to ground far from Sudan’s frontier.

This mirrors broader accusations that Emirati financial and logistical networks have sustained RSF operations, including through gold trade links and diversified air and overland routes when one channel faced pressure.

Implications and Responses

The Chadian strike underscores how Sudan’s war is spilling across borders and how external supply lines remain contested. Chad, which hosts hundreds of thousands of Sudanese refugees and has faced earlier cross-border incidents (including a March 2026 drone attack that killed civilians), now finds itself further entangled. Its government has condemned the sovereignty violation while maintaining it seeks only peace in Sudan.

International agencies continue monitoring equipment destruction, material losses, and any RSF personnel casualties from the convoy strike. The episode reinforces long-standing calls for greater transparency and accountability regarding external involvement in Sudan’s conflict. While the UAE rejects accusations of fueling the war, the accumulation of flight data, satellite imagery, UN expert findings, phone tracking, and on-the-ground reporting from multiple independent outlets has kept the issue of its role—and that of other external actors—central to analysis of why the fighting persists and expands.

As verification of the latest strike’s full impact continues on the ground, the incident serves as a stark illustration of how regional power projection, proxy logistics, and hired gun networks continue to shape one of the most devastating conflicts of the decade.